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Abstract 
Cost inefficiency scores for banks in ten new EU member countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe are estimated using a parametric approach (stochastic frontier analysis) for the period 
prior to and immediately following their accession (2000-2010). These are then employed in 
both static and dynamic panels to estimate the impact of regulation on bank specific 
inefficiency in the transition economies. Using the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom 
(Gwartney et. al, 2012) we find that, among all the indices of economic freedom, the 
composite regulation index that includes regulation in credit, labour and business is the one 
that has more importance for the banking sector as it exerts a negative and statistically 
significant impact on bank inefficiency. By decomposing the regulation index, into its three 
components (credit, business and labour regulation) we find that strict labour regulation is 
associated with higher bank inefficiency while certain aspect of credit regulation such as 
foreign ownership and competition as well as private ownership are significantly associated 
with decreased bank inefficiency. The dynamic panel-VAR results using impulse response 
functions and variance decomposition support the validity of these results further. These 
results are valuable for both academics and policy makers in their attempts to understand 
what could drive bank inefficiency.  
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1.  Introduction and Literature Review 
The on-going financial crisis possesses many challenges but also provides an opportunity to 
enhance efforts for financial consolidation in a constructive way. In particular, a major 
challenge that policy makers and marker participants face alike in the financial markets refers 
to on-going discussions about the role of financial regulation in relation to its impact to the 
industry’s performance. This paper focuses on the impact of regulation on the banking 
sector’s performance, as the latter is the principal component of the well-functioning of 
financial markets. However, the importance of regulation is certainly not limited to the 
banking sector, but especially at the times of crisis, decreased bank performance may have 
heavy negative effects for a country’s economy because of a potential destabilisation of the 
financial system and credit crunch effects. Evidence of credit crunch and vulnerable financial 
markets have been observed over recent years, making a case to study further the importance 
of regulation in difficult times.  
At the outset it is worth mentioning that regulation in general has very different layers and as 
such cover different sectors whilst some also the economy as a whole, some are industry 
specific other are more general. The literature that relates regulation to bank performance so 
far has been largely dominated by regulation specific to the banking/financial sector as this 
type of prudential regulations are considered by policy makers to be an important tool to 
ensure a sound financial system. In the recent years there has been an increasing amount of 
cross-country empirical studies that links financial regulation and supervisory practices to 
bank performance (Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Pasiouras, 2008;  Pasiouras et 
al.,2009; Barth et al. 2010; Delis et al., 2011)1.  A consensus though in the literature on what                                                                                                                 1  Barth  (2004)  examines  supervisory  practices  and  regulations  in  the  banking  sectors  of  107  economies  and   finds   a   positive   and   significant   impact   of   private   monitoring   on   bank   performance   but   not   a  statistically  significant  relationship  between  bank  performance  and  official  supervisory  power  and  capital  stridency.  Beck  et  al.  (2006)  in  a  study  of  2,500  firms  across  37  countries  find  that  supervisory  strategy  that  focuses  on  empowering  private  monitoring  of  banks  by  forcing  them  to  disclose  accurate  information  to  the  private  sector  tends  to  lower  the  degree  to  which  corruption  of  bank  officials  is  an  obstacle  to  firms  raising  external   finance.  Pasiouras  (2008)  examines  the  effect  of  a  series  of   financial  regulations  on  the  performance  of  banks  as  measured  by  technical  efficiency  and  finds  that  although  strict  capital  adequacy,  market  discipline  power  and  powerful  supervision  are  positively  associated  with  efficiency,  the  effect   is  statistically  significant  only  for  regulation  related  to  market  discipline  power.  In  another  study,  Pasiouras  et  al.  (2009)  investigate  the  impact  of  the  three  pillars  of  Basel  II  and  restrictions  on  bank  activities     on  bank  efficiency.  The  authors  find  that  regulation  that  boosts  market  discipline  and  the  supervisory  power  of  authorities  is  positively  related  with  bank  efficiency.  On  the  other  hand,  restrictions  on  bank  activities  increase  profit  efficiency  but  reduce  cost  efficiency,  while  stricter  capital  requirements  have  the  opposite  effect.  Barth  et  al.  (2010)  examined  whether  bank  regulation,  supervision  and  monitoring  improves  bank  efficiency,  based  on  an  unbalanced  panel  of  around  4,000  observation  in  72  countries  over  the  1999-­‐2007  period.   The   authors   find   that   tighter   restrictions   on   bank   activities   have   a   negative   impact   on   bank  efficiency,  while  increased  capital  regulation  stringency  has  a  marginal  positive  effect  on  efficiency.  They  
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constitutes good regulation, or how specific regulations influence the performance and 
stability of the banking sector (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008) has not been  reached.  
What is striking though is the absence of any studies that have thoroughly  examined the 
impact of non-financial regulation on bank performance. This is of additional importance in  
light of the recent financial turmoil as many countries enhance efforts to improve their 
competitiveness and foster growth with structural reforms related to their business 
environment in parallel with an exercise of armouring their financial sector to weather out the 
crisis. By no means, this is an easy task. 
Early empirical studies of bank crisis determinants such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998, 2002) find that better institutional quality at the country-level decreases the probability 
for a country to experience banking crises and limits the impact of moral hazard due to 
deposit insurance. Institutional variables, such as rule of law and quality of bureaucracy, in 
these studies are interpreted as proxies for bank-specific supervision and regulation because 
of data unavailability of these dimensions at the time.  Data availability on bank-specific 
regulation led to studies that are focusing on such regulations while indices of non-bank 
specific institutional and regulatory quality are being used as control variables. The research 
philosophy behind such an approach is to examine not only whether bank-specific regulations 
exist as legislation but also to what extent they are being practically enforced. Even in such a 
framework the, importance of the non-financial institutional and regulatory framework in 
explaining cross-country differences in bank performance is emphasized by Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. (2004)2. On the other hand, studies that are explicitly focusing on the importance of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         also   find   that   enhanced   official   supervisory   power   is   positively   associated   with   efficiency   only   in  countries  with  independent  supervisory  authorities.  In  a  more  recent  study,  Delis  et  al.  (2011)  examine  the    relationship  between  the  banking  regulatory  and  supervision  framework  and  banking  productivity  in  22  transition  economies.  Their  results  indicate  that  private  monitoring  and  restrictions  on  bank  activities  have  a  positive  impact  on  productivity  while  regulation  related  to  the  first  and  second  pillars  of  Basel  II  (capital   requirements   and   official   supervisory   power)   do   not   appear   to   have   a   statistically   significant  impact  on  productivity  although  they  appear  to  gain  importance  in  the  post  financial  crisis  period  (after  2007).  2  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt  et  al.  (2004)  in  a  study  of  1,400  banks  across  72  countries    find  that  once  they  control  for   variables   reflecting   the   non-­‐financial   regulatory   framework   such   as   the   general   level   of      economic  freedom   and   the   level   of   protection   of   property   rights,   bank   regulations   become   insignificant  determinants   of   net   interest   margins   in   the   banking   sector   while   these   non-­‐financial   regulatory    indicators   affect   negatively   net   interest  margins   as  well   as   bank   overheads.   The   authors   conclude   that  bank   regulations   cannot   be   viewed   in   isolation   from   the   non-­‐bank   regulatory   and   institutional  framework.   In   another   study  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt   et   al.   (2008)  examine  whether   compliance  with   the  Basel  Core  Principles  (BCPs)  for  Effective  Banking  Supervision    improves  bank  soundness.  The  authors  confirm  a  significant  and  positive  relationship  between  bank  soundness  and  compliance  with  principles  related  to  information   provision   while   their   results   remain   robust   after   controlling   inter   alia   for   country   level  institutional   quality   as  proxied  by   the   rule   of   law.  However,   the  overall   index  of  BCP   loses  much  of   its  statistical   significance   once   institutional   quality   is   controlled   for.   Furthermore   most   of   the   other  
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country-level institutional/regulatory quality as determinants of bank inefficiency are very 
scarce (Lensink et al. 2008; Hasan et al. 2009). 
There are three issues that emerge from previous studies that examine the impact of country-
level regulations on bank performance.  First of all, most studies focus on prudential and 
supervisory regulations specific to the banking/financial sector. Secondly, other country-level 
regulatory or institutional variables have been mostly used as control variables when the 
importance of banking/financial regulation is under examination. Finally, the scarce literature 
that explicitly examines the impact of institutions and regulations on bank performance does 
not adequately differentiate between different types of regulatory/institutional quality, which 
is important in order to prioritize reform efforts. 
In this paper we contribute in the literature in several ways. By using the regulation 
components of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom we examine the impact of credit 
(financial), labour and business environment regulation on bank performance (inefficiency) 
in the EU-10 economies.  The credit regulation index used in this study is mostly related to 
regulation about the ownership structure of a country’s banking system (government-owned 
banks, private banks and foreign-owned banks). Previous research on the link between the 
ownership structure of the banking sector and its performance provides evidence that 
privately owned banks perform better than their government owned counterparts (Mian, 
2003; Mico et al. 2007; Cornet et al. 2010, Berger et al. 2005, Lin and Zhang, 2009). The 
comparatively poorer performance of government owned banks in comparison with private 
banks can be attributed in the influence of politics in the operation of the former (Mico et al., 
2007; Dinc 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005, Cole 2009;  Carvahlo, 2010; Sapienza; 2004). 
Private banks can be categorized between foreign and domestic. The theoretical framework in 
research related to the comparison of the performance between domestic and foreign banks is 
based on two alternative hypothesis formed by Berger et al. (2000).  According to the first 
hypothesis, the “home field advantage’, domestic banks can operate more efficiently than 
foreign banks in their own country as they are more familiar with the local business 
environment and institutional framework. Under the alternative hypothesis, the “global 
advantage”, foreign banks may possess enough firm-specific advantages to overcome the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         components   of   the   BCPs   index   are   found   not   to   be   significant   determinants   of   bank   soundness   in  regressions  that  the  rule  of  law  index  is  present. 
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liability of being foreign and so even outperform local competitors in a host economy. In 
terms of emerging and less developed economies most of the evidence supports the “global 
advantage” hypothesis (Classens et al. 2001; Mico et al. 2007; Detragiache et al. 2001; Bonin 
et al. 2005; Grigorian and Manole, 2002). There are though studies in terms of emerging 
economies that find support for the “home field advantage” hypothesis (Yildirim and 
Phillipatos, 2007, Nikiel and Opiela, 2002) while some studies do not find significant 
differences in terms of performance between host country and foreign banks (Crystal et al. 
2001; Mian 2003). 
Another contribution of this study to the literature is that we investigate the impact of labor 
and business regulation on bank performance. As far as concerns labour regulation the 
relevance for the banking sector is twofold. First of all the ability of banks to control cost 
generally, as well as personnel expenses in particular,  is an important objective for bank 
managers as it the efficient utilization of resources is important for success in the financial 
industry (Spong et al., 2005). Secondly, to the extent that labour regulation has a negative or 
positive impact on the performance of firms located within a national jurisdiction then this 
could affect the performance of the country’s banking sector through  spillover effects such 
as lower or higher loan default rates. 
The existence of labour market regulation is based on the rationale for protection of 
employees from arbitrary acrtions by employers. However, it may increase the costs of firms 
to employ workers and adjust employment to the optimal level (Nickel, 1997). Most of the 
empirical literature that relates  labour regulation to economic outcomes such as output and 
unemployment (e.g.,Botero et al., 2004, Nickell and Layard, 2000, Heckman and Pagés, 
2004, Lazear, 1990, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000 and Blanchard and Portugal, 2001) finds 
that strict labour regulation has a negative impact on economic performance. While there is a 
growing consensus  in the literature related to the effects of labour regulation on employment, 
relatively less is known about the impact of labour regulation on productivity. When it comes 
to studies that focus on productivity growth the evidence is mixed. A stream of recent studies 
that find a negative impact of labour regulation on investment and productivity growth 
(Besley and Burgess 2004; Bassanini et al. 2009; Autor et al. 2007). Such productivity losses 
can be explained by rising employment costs as a result of stricter employment protection 
legislation (Bassanini and Ernst 2002; Scarpetta and Tressel 2004).   On the other hand, other 
recent studies such as Storm and Naastepad (2009)  and Deakin & Sarkar (2008) find that 
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more strict labour regulation can lead to productivity gains as firms and employees are more 
inclined to invest in the increase the firm-specific skills of the workforce (Wasmer 2006; 
Auer 2007). 
Business regulations and bureaucratic procedures that restrain business entry and reduce 
competition may also affect bank performance through spillover effects. In particular 
regulatory entry barriers can lead to decreased competition through decreased entrance of 
new firms in an industry (Klapper et al. 2006; Djankov et al. 2007). This decreased 
competitive pressure can lead to decreased investment (Alesina et al. 2005), reduced growth 
(Loyaza et al. 2005) and reduced productivity (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Bastos and 
Nasir, 2004; Bourlès et al., 2010 ).  Strict business regulation then can have a negative effect 
on the performance of firms located in a country and so affect the fulfilment of the 
obligations these firms have to the banking sector of this country. In addition to this, 
increased business regulation is found to induce informality (Loyaza et al. 2005) so making it 
harder for banks to assess the creditworthiness of a firm.  
 
Furthermore, in order to evaluate the relative importance of economic freedom in the 
regulation of credit, labour and business in comparison with other elements of economic 
freedom we include in the initial estimations the rest of the economic freedom variables 
(limited size of government, legal structure and property rights, access to sound money and 
freedom to trade with foreigners).  
 
Finally, we opt to focus this study in a sample of banks in the EU-10 economies that are 
actively involved in a process of financial integration and for who a wider definition of 
regulation could prove of some significance for their performance. Previous studies related to 
bank performance in transition economies and the ownership structure of the transition 
banking systems in both a country case study and cross-country framework (Taci and 
Zampieri, 1998; Opiela, 2001; Matousek and Taci, 2002; Nikiel and Opiela, 2002; Hasan and 
Marton, 2003; Dimova, 2004 ; Green et al., 2004 ; Asaftei and Kumbhakar, 2005; Bonin et 
al., 2005 ; Fries and Taci, 2005; Havrylchyk, 2006; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006 ; Mamatzakis 
et al., 2008 ; Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2008 ; Kosac et al., 2010; Fang et al., 2011) have not 
reached a consensus. In this respect the credit regulation components of the Fraser Index used 
in this study sheds more light in this issue. Furthermore, the employment of the labour and 
business regulation indices of the Fraser Index for the first time in the bank performance 
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context in combination with the fact that the transition of the EU-10 countries to full market 
economies is largely completed adds to the literature by identifying non-transition related 
regulation that could impact bank efficiency.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
methodology, Section 3  presents the econometric results. The final section concludes.  
2.  Variables and Methodology 
2.1 Measuring Cost Inefficiency 
We use data from IBCA-Bankscope for the 2000-2010 periods. The sample includes 187 
commercial banks and, after removing errors and inconsistencies, 1164 bank/year 
observations remain in an unbalanced panel.  The sample includes the majority of the 
commercial banks in the EU-10 economies.   
In this study we follow Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) and opt 
for the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) methodology in order to estimate bank cost 
inefficiency. A major advantage of this methodology is that both random error and 
inefficiency are incorporated in a composite error term.  
More specifically, we assume the following specification for the cost frontier: 
 
TCit = f (Pit, Yit,,  Nit,   Zit) + vit + uit                             (1) 
 
Where TCit  the total cost for firm (bank) i at year t, P is a vector of input prices Y is a vector 
of outputs of the firm, N a vector of fixed netputs while Z is a vector of control variables. 
SFA, separates the error term into two components; The term ui, stands for bank inefficiency 
that is in the control of management and follows the half-normal distribution. Such 
inefficiency has the potential to increase the costs of a bank above the best-practice level. The 
term vi on the other hand, represents fluctuations that are beyond the firm’s management (are 
random).  
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For the empirical implementation of the cost frontier, the following translog specification is 
used3: 
lnTCi = α0 + ∑
i
ii Pa ln  + ∑
i
iYlniβ  + ½ ∑∑
i j
iij PjPa lnln +½∑∑ ΥΥ
i j
jij i lnlnβ   +
∑∑ Υ
i j
jiij P lnlnδ +∑
i
iilnΝφ +½∑∑
i j
ji NP lnlnijξ ∑∑+
i j
ji NY lnlnijζ +∑
i
iZiξ + ui+ vi
                                                                                      (2) 
In the quadratic terms of the stochastic frontier model (2) we impose standard linear 
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions. Additionally, we include time and country effects. 
The model then is estimated via a maximum likelihood procedure parameterized in terms of 
the variance parameters 2εσ =
2
uσ  +
2
vσ and γ = 
2
uσ /
2
εσ . 
In order to define bank inputs and outputs we follow Sealey and Lindley (1977) and opt for 
the intermediation approach. This approach assumes that the main function of banks is to use 
labour and capital in order to collect funds with the scope of transforming them into loans and 
other income generating assets. More specifically, two inputs and two outputs are specified. 
Inputs include labour (as measured by personnel expenses) and financial capital while loans 
(net of provisions) and other earning assets (government securities, bonds, equity 
investments, CDs and T-bills) are the outputs. 
In terms of the input prices, we calculate the price of the financial capital as the ratio of total 
interest expenses to total interest bearing borrowed funds while the price of labour is 
represented with the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The sum of overheads, such 
as personnel and administrative expenses, interest, fee, and commission expenses, represent 
the total cost of each bank in the sample. 
Furthermore,  we include the total level of equity of  each bank in the model as a quasi-fixed 
netput. The reason for this is twofold: Firstly, equity represents an alternative source of 
funding for a bank. In this way, the level of equity of each bank has the potential to affect 
directly its vcost structure (Berger and Mester, 1997).  In addition to this, ignoring financial 
capital may lead to a biased estimation of efficiency as firms with higher equity capital, 
which denotes that the shareholders have more capital at stake, may behave in a more risk 
averse manner than firms with lower level of equity but still optimally (efficiently) given the                                                                                                                 3  For  simplification,  we  omit  the  subscripts  for  time  (t).      
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risk preferences of their shareholders. Additionally we include also each bank’s level of fixed 
assets (as a proxy for physical capital)  which is also a standard in the literature related to 
inefficiency estimation (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
 
Finally, in estimating the efficiency frontier in a cross-country context is important to use 
variables that could capture country-level heterogeneity both in terms of the general 
macroeconomic environment but also in terms of the banking industry of each country as 
both of these kind of country-level variables have an influence on the technology of banks 
located within specific national boundaries. Thus, we also include real GDP growth per 
capita as an indicator of the dynamism of each economy. To control for macroeconomic 
stability we include the inflation rate. Finally, we use the ratio of inhabitants per square 
kilometre (DENS), a measure of population density, as a proxy for bank accessibility to 
potential customers. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the overall sample and 
by country over the period 2000-2010.  
2.2 Determinants of Cost Inefficiency 
The next part of the analysis uses the cost inefficiency scores in 3.1 to estimate the impact of 
the business regulatory environment in the EU-10 economies, using as control variables bank 
specific characteristics, the structure of the national financial systems and the level of 
economic development. 
 
 
2.2.1 The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom and its Components 
 
A major focus of the paper is to examine the impact of economic freedom with a particular 
focus of regulation on the performance of the banking sector and therefore the Fraser Index 
of Economic Freedom (Gwartney et. al, 2012) is included in the models. The use of this 
index is common in the economics literature4 and consists of five factors: size of government 
(GOV-FR); legal structure and security of property rights (LEG-FR); access to sound money 
(MON-FR); freedom to exchange with foreigners (TRD-FR); and regulation of credit, labour, 
and business (REG-FR). These are weighted and form a composite index, with 0 indicating 
the lowest and 10 the highest level of economic freedom.  In this paper, we put a special 
emphasis on regulation and particularly credit regulation and its impact on the banking 
industry.                                                                                                                 
4 See for example Carlsson and Lundstrom (2002).  
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Thus, the credit regulations component is decomposed to account for the following: i) 
ownership of banks measured as percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks, ii) 
foreign competition defined as domestic banks face competition from foreign banks (rate of 
approval of foreign bank applications and the share of foreign banks over the total banking 
sector assets), iii) private sector credit, measuring the extend that government borrowing does 
not crowd out private borrowing, and iv) negative real interest rates due to interest rate 
controls and regulations. 
The first two sub-components provide evidence on the extent to which the banking industry is 
dominated by private firms and whether foreign banks are permitted to compete in the 
market. The final two sub-components indicate the extent to which credit is supplied to the 
private sector and whether controls on interest rates interfere with the credit market.  
The composite labour (LR-REG) and business regulations (BR-REG) components are also 
added in the analysis in order to examine their impact on bank performance. The LR-REG 
variable is designed to measure the extent to which labour market rigidities are present. In 
order to earn high marks in the LR-REG component, a country must allow market forces to 
determine wages and establish the conditions of hiring and firing, and refrain from the use of 
conscription. The BR-REG variable aims to identify the extent to which regulations and 
bureaucratic procedures restrain entry and reduce competition. In order to score high in this 
part of the index, countries must allow markets to determine prices and refrain from 
regulatory activities that retard entry into business and increase the cost of producing 
products. They also must refrain from using their power to extract financial payments and 
reward some businesses at the expense of others. 
The average scores of the Economic Freedom components across the EU-10 economies over 
2000-2010 periods are shown in Table 2. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
We observe that although the level of general economic freedom (ALL-FR) stands at the 7.01 
level in the region, some components of the economic freedom are below that figure as for 
example the size of government (GOV-FR), the protection of legal rights (LEG-FR) and 
regulation (REG-FR) with values of 5.43, 6.26 and 6.90 respectively. It seems that reforms 
related to sound money (MON-FR) and trade liberalisation (TRD-FR) are more prevalent in 
the EU-10 economies as the regional averages for these indices stand at the 8.80 and 7.69 
level respectively. At the country level, the best performers in terms of overall economic 
freedom (ALL-FR) are Estonia (7.82), Slovakia (7.24) and Latvia (7.21).  Moreover, Estonia 
and Latvia score better than the regional average in all the major components of the index of 
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economic freedom. On the other hand, Romania (6.66) and the Czech Republic (6.90) 
represent the worst performers, in terms of the overall economic freedom (ALL-FR), in the 
region. In Table 3 the economic freedom variables over time in the EU-10 are depicted. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
The overall economic freedom (ALL-FR) in the region has generally improved from 6.42 in 
2000 to 7.18 in 2010. The most improved economic freedom components is the access to 
sound money (MON-FR), which increased from 6.99 in 2000 to 9.25 in 2010. The variables 
reflecting government size (GOV-FR) and regulation (REG-FR) have also improved  over the 
2000-2010 period but less remarkably than the access to sound money (MON-FR) 
component. It is noteworthy the fact that two economic freedom components: legal rights 
protection (LEG-FR) and freedom to exchange with foreigners (TRD-FR) have slightly 
declined over the period under study. 
In Table 4 the cross-country scores of the sub-components of the regulation component 
(REG-FR) of the Economic Freedom index over the 2000-2010 period are shown.   
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
One cannot fail to notice that reforms related to credit regulation (CR-REG) are more 
established in the EU-10 economies in comparison with freedom in the labour market (LR-
REG) and business regulation (BR-REG). In fact the regional average for credit regulation 
(CR-REG) stands at the 8.78 level while the corresponding figures for labour regulation (LR-
REG) and business regulation (BR-REG) are 5.92 and 5.96 respectively.  At the country level 
the best performers in terms of credit regulation (CR-REG) are Bulgaria (9.77) and Estonia 
(9.75) while the worst is Romania (7.57). In terms of labour regulation (LR-REG) the most 
liberalised labour markets are Czech Republic (6.94) and Slovakia (6.60) while Slovenia 
(4.51) and Romania (4.99) represent the countries with the most rigid labour regulation in the 
EU-10 region. Moreover, business regulation (BR-REG) is significantly more liberal in 
Estonia (6.84) than the rest of the EU-10 economies while Bulgaria (5.60) and Poland (5.65) 
are the countries with the most strict business regulation (BR-REG). When it comes to the 
subcomponents of the credit regulation (CR-REG) index, we notice that reforms related to 
interest rate controls (CR-NIR) are almost completed in the EU-10 as the regional average 
stands at the 9.82 and no country scores below 9.40. On the other hand, the rest of the credit 
regulation (CR-REG) subcomponents have additional room for improvement as the regional 
averages for private ownership of banks (CR-OWN), competition from foreign banks (CR-
COMP) and freedom from government borrowing (CR-PRS)  stand at the 8.27, 8.01 and 8.26 
levels respectively. There is also a significant heterogeneity in the speed that reforms for each 
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regulation sub-component has been adapted in the EU-10 economies as it can be show in 
Table 5.  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Both credit regulation (CR-REG) and labour regulation (LR-REG) have significantly 
improved over time in the EU-10 economies. Credit Regulation (CR-REG) has improved 
from 7.63 in 2000 to 8.88 in 2010 while freedom from labour regulation (LR-REG) has 
increased from 4.90 to 6.48 over the same period. On the other hand, business regulation has 
experience a slight deterioration from 6.48 in 2000 to 6.05 in 2010. The subcomponents of 
the credit regulation (CR-REG) that show the highest level of improvement over the  period 
under study are the private ownership of banks (CR-OWN) and the competition from foreign 
banks (CR-COMP).  The index for the private ownership for banks (CR-OWN) has increased 
from 4.75 in 2000 to 8.94 in 2010 while the competition from foreign banks variable reached 
the 8.64 level in 2009 while it was 6.00 in 2010. The freedom from government borrowing 
(CR-PRS)  variable is the only credit regulation subcomponent that has experienced a 
decrease as it stands at the 7.70 level in 2010 while the corresponding figure for 2000 is 8.24. 
 
2.2.2 Bank-specific and Country-specific Control Variables 
A number of control variables are used to account for individual bank characteristics:  total 
assets (TA) represent the size of the loan portfolio of each bank and is expected to have a 
positive impact on cost inefficiency as it may indicate higher diversification (Mester, 1993);  
the ratio of loans to assets (LA), which is also expected to be positive as it represents well-
functioning intermediation by the bank; and finally the loan loss provisions as a  share to total 
loans (LLP/L) is a proxy for default risk as it measures the quality of the credit portfolio. The 
use of such proxy for default risk though is related both to endogenous factors (“bad 
management” hypothesis) and exogenous to the bank factors such as systemic economic or 
financial crisis (“bad luck” hypothesis). Finally according to the “skimping” hypothesis, 
banks that dedicate a lot of resources in screening the quality of their loan portfolio may 
experience increased cost inefficiency in the short-term which is compensated by low cost 
inefficiency in the medium and long-term because of low loan loss provisions. The ratio of 
cash and due from banks to total assets (C/A) is used as a proxy for liquidity risk.  From the 
one side, a high C/A ratio can serve as a defence mechanism in case of urgent liquidity issue, 
but on the other hand relatively high availability of liquid assets could increase bank costs 
because of additional expenses required in terms of storage costs and other kinds of expenses 
such as labour costs. 
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To control for financial development, domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP 
(PSC/GDP) represents the level of development of the financial sector. Moreover, to account 
for the level of competition on the banking industry in each country, we use the assets of the 
three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks (the C3 ratio). Finally, to  
control for the general level of economic development and capture the sophistication of the 
domestic market, real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) term is used. 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Cost Inefficiency Estimates 
Cost inefficiency estimation are reported in Table 6.  Those inefficiency scores represent 
averages over the period 2000-2010.  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
One cannot fail to notice that that the average bank cost inefficiency for the sample is 
relatively low at the 17%, that is, these banks need to improve by 17%, to reach the cost 
efficiency frontier. Such inefficiency scores are comparable with other studies in the 
transition economies (see for example Kosac et al., 2005; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006).  At 
the country level, banks in Romania and Hungary have the highest cost inefficiency levels, 
with scores of 0.194 and 0.184 respectively, whereas banks in Slovenia are the best 
performers with inefficiency scores at around 0.144. In terms of the time series, there is a real 
inconsistency as the early years show increasing cost efficiency levels at the mean.   
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
In terms of the time series, there is a steady trend of improvement during the pre-accession 
and accession period, which is characterised by declining cost inefficiency, levels at the 
mean. However, from 2005 there is a trend reversal characterised by increasing levels of 
inefficiency. This can be explained by the challenges faced by these countries of the new, 
much more competitive environment faced by the banking sectors and the liberalised markets 
in which they now operated. 
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3.2 The Determinants of Cost Inefficiency – Static Fixed Effect Results 
 
As a first step of the analysis of the cost inefficiency determinants we reun the following 
general model in a static fixed effects framework: 
  Inef!,!    = α+β!  x!,!   + β!  s!,!  +  β!  m!,!   + β!    EF!,!    +  e!,!                         (3) 
, where Inef!,!    is the vector of bank specific cost inefficiency scores from stage one, x!,!  is a 
vector of bank specific explanatory variables, m!,!   is the level of economic development, s!,!  is a vector of financial structure variables and   EF!,!   a vector of economic freedom 
variables from the Fraser Index and e!,!   is a vector of random errors.   
3.2.1 Major Components of the Fraser index of Economic Freedom 
The first stage of the analysis considers the impact of overall index of economic freedom 
(ALL-FR) and its major components ( government size (GOV-FR), legal rights protection 
(LEG-FR), access to sound money (MON-FR), freedom to exchange with foreigners (TRD-
FR) and the composite regulation index (REG-FR) on bank cost inefficiency. Eight models 
are estimated for the period 2000-2010. In the first base model the regressors include just the 
bank specific variables, financial structure and macroeconomic variables. The models 2 to 6 
include each time a different component of the Fraser index of economic freedom, model 7 
includes the control variables and the regressors of the all the major components of the 
economic freedom index contemporaneously while model 8 includes the control variables 
and the overall index of economic freedom (ALL-FR). These results are in Table 8.   
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
In terms of the bank-specific control variables, the loan to assets ratio (L/A) is significant at 
the 5% level in all models and exerts a negative impact on cost inefficiency. This result 
provides evidence that the banks in our sample with higher intermediation capacity incur 
lower levels of cost inefficiency. Equally, the coefficient of cash and due from banks to total 
assets ratio (C/A) is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in all the 
specification confirm the importance of liquidity availability for increased efficiency of bank 
operations. Furthermore, the loan loss provision to total loans ratio (LLP/L) is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and has a positive coefficient in all the models banks implying that 
less effort on loan screening comes at a cost in terms of bank inefficiency. There is also some 
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tentative evidence that the more capital at risk, the stronger are shareholders’ incentives to 
monitor management and assure that the bank operates efficiently as the coefficient of the 
equity to assets ratio (E/A) is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level in models 
2,4, and 8. Finally, bank size , as measured by a bank’s total assets (lnTA), is positively 
related with inefficiency however its coefficient is not statistically different from zero at any 
of the models. The country level control variables are generally statistically insignificant with 
the exception of the concentration ratio (C3) that is statistically significant at the 10% level in 
models 3 and 7 providing some weak evidence that decreased level of competition in the 
banking industry of a country is associated with increased inefficiency. 
Most of the major components of the Fraser index of economic freedom as well as the overall 
index of economic freedom (ALL-FR) do not exert a statistically significant impact on bank 
inefficiency. The exception is the protection of legal rights (LEG-FR) in model 3.  The 
coefficient of the legal rights (LEG-FR) variable is statistically significant at the 10% and 
positive. This result remains robust in model 7 when we control for the rest of economic 
freedom components. This maybe justified by a more careful screening by bank managers of 
operations such as loan origination when high costs are associated with the enforcement of 
contractual agreements (Zazzaro, 2005). The adverse impact of legislation that in theory 
could improve bank performance such as lower costs of contract enforcement is not new in 
the literature. For example, Manove et al. (2001) show that the use of collateral in the process 
of loan origination could lead to a significant decrease in the screening efforts of banks and as 
a consequence make them to provide credit to a high number of worthless projects. 
3.2.2 Credit (CR-REG), Labour (LR-REG) and Business Regulation (BR-REG) 
The next stage in the analysis considers the impact of the subcomponents of the regulation 
variable (REG-FR) of the Fraser index of economic freedom on cost inefficiency.  These 
subcomponents include the composite credit regulation (CR-REG) and then two aspects of 
this:  labour market conditions (LR-REG) and business regulations (BR-REG).  
Four models are estimated for the period 2000-2010.  As in section 4.2.1 the regressors 
include the bank specific variables, financial structure and macroeconomic variables as 
controls and the composite credit regulation (CR-REG) in the first model, the labour market 
regulation (LR-REG) in the second and business regulation (BR-REG) in the third.  In the 
fourth model all the regulation sub-components are included. These results are depicted in 
Table 9. 
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(Insert Table 9 about here) 
In the first model and the third models, the composite credit regulation (CR-REG) and the 
business regulation (BR-REG) are not statistically significant. However, the impact of labour 
regulation (LR-REG) in the second model is statistically significant at the 10% level and 
exerts a negative impact on inefficiency . These results are further confirmed in model 4 that 
includes all the regulation subcomponents, as the regressor of labour regulation (LR-REG)  
increase is statistical significance at the 5% level while retains its negative. The other two 
regulation variables, credit regulation (CR-REG) and business regulation (BR-RG) remain 
not statistically significant in the fourth model. The positive impact of liberal labour 
regulation on bank performance is in line with previous studies that find a negative effect of 
strict labour regulation on economic performance (Bassanini et al. 2009, Autor 2007) due to 
increased costs associated with such regulation. Furthermore, liberal reforms in the labour 
market may decrease employee complacency and the associated absenteeism (Ichino and 
Riphahn, 2005; Riphahn 2004) and increase firm performance. 
With respect to the bank specific, macroeconomic and financial structure control variables 
the results remain largely similar to section 4.2.1. The loan to assets ratio (L/A) and the cash 
to assets (C/A) have a statistically significant and negative impact on inefficiency in all the 
models while the loan loss provisions to total loans ratio (LLP/L) continues to exerts a a 
statistically significant and positive impact on inefficiency. Moreover, none of the 
macroeconomic and financial structure variables has a statistically different zero than impact 
on inefficiency. 
 
3.2.3 Decomposing Credit Regulations 
 
Somewhat is striking that industry specific regulation, such as credit regulation (CR-REG), 
does not have an impact on bank specific efficiency as one would expect. A possible cause 
could be the high degree of aggregation in this index of regulation. To investigate, further the 
impact of credit regulation on bank efficiency, we next opt for its main components, as 
defined by CR-OWN, that is the percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks, by 
CR-COMP that is foreign banks presence in the domestic market, by CR-PRS that is 
government borrowing that does not crowd out private sector borrowing, and last by CR-NIR 
that is the negative interest rates. These results are available in Table 10. 
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(Insert Table 10 about here) 
These results show that CR-OWN (model 1) is not significant whilst CR-Comp (model 2) is 
significant at the 5% level and has a negative impact on cost inefficiency. On the other hand, 
CR-PRS (model 3) carries a positive sign and it is significant at the 10% level.  The result for 
CR-COMP variable is expected as it is a measure of openness.  Furthermore, the 
interpretation of this variable has two dimensions. Firstly, the extent to which foreign banks 
are allowed to enter the domestic market may have a negative impact on inefficiency of 
domestic banks due to enhanced competition as any moral hazard arising from protection 
against external competition is removed. Secondly, the level of operations of foreign banks 
assert a negative impact on inefficiency because they bring technological innovation in 
domestic markets as well as advanced management and risk assessment expertises sourced 
from their global operations. This result provides evidence for the “global advantage 
hypothesis’’ posed by Berger et al. (2000) and supports the literature (Grigorian and Manole, 
2002; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Fries and Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005) on the advantages 
of the presence of foreign banks in host country markets and the ability for foreigner to hold 
equity in domestic banks.5  
In terms of ownership structure,  private ownership (CR-OWN)  is negatively associated with 
cost inefficiency but not statistically significant. Thus, it appears that foreign bank 
penetration as part of national privatisation programmes was a more important determinant of 
cost inefficiency in the banking sectors of these new EU member states than simply the 
transfer of state owned assets to the domestic private sector. 
Two other credit regulation variables remain.  Credit to the private sector (CR-PRS) has a 
positive and significant impact on cost inefficiency. This implies that cost inefficiency is 
enhanced when credit is directed to the state.  In this sample, good practice in risk assessment 
is in its infancy and government borrowing is less costly with respect to screening and 
probably more secure as the probability of default is lower than debt to the private sector as 
the loans directed towards the public sector are cover by explicit or implicit government 
guarantees (Mian, 2003). Furthermore, increased foreign bank presence in the EU-10 
economies may favour lending to the government instead of opaque firms (Mian, 2006; 
                                                                                                                5  For  the  importance  of  foreign  ownership  on  developing  economies  from  east  Europe  see  Matousek and 
Taci (2002), Dimova (2004), Fries and Taci (2005), Asaftei and Kumbhakar (2005), Havrylchyk,( 2006) and 
Pruteanu-Podpiera (2008).  
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Berger et al. 2001), for which credit risk assessment based on “hard” information becomes 
more difficult and so more risky. 
Finally, the regulation on the control of interest rates (CR-NIR) is not statistically significant. 
The results remain robust in the model 5 when all the regulation variables are included in the 
model. 
With respect to the bank specific, macroeconomic and financial structure control variables 
the results remain largely similar to the section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. One important difference is 
that in model 5 of table 10, when all the credit regulation variables are controlled for, the 
positive impact of the loan loss provisions to total loans ratio (LLP/L) becomes statistically 
insignificant.  
 
3.3  The Determinants of Cost Inefficiency –  Dynamic Panel Data Results 
To further examine the impact of economic freedom and in particular the impact of regulation 
on the inefficiency of the banking systems of the EU-10 economies we employ a dynamic 
panel data analysis. The use of instrumental variables in the dynamic analysis deals with 
potential endogeneity issues. In particular we opt for the Arellano and Bover (1995) estimator 
and thus equation (3) takes the following form: Inef!,!    = α  +Inef!,!!!  +β!  x!,!   + β!  s!,!  +  β!  m!,!   + β!    EF!,!    +  e!,!                         (4) 
 
, where Inef!,!    is the vector of bank specific cost inefficiency scores from stage one, x!,!  is a 
vector of bank specific explanatory variables, m!,!   is the level of economic development, s!,!  is a vector of financial structure variables and   EF!,!   a vector of economic freedom 
variables from the Fraser Index and e!,!   is a vector of random errors. 
3.3.1 Major Components of the Fraser index of Economic Freedom- Dynamic Estimation 
Table 11 depicts the results of the dynamic panel data estimation for the models that include 
the overall index of economic freedom (ALL-FR) as well as its five major components. 
(Insert Table 11 about here) 
 In terms of the bank specific variables the equity to assets ratio exerts a negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level impact on bank inefficiency reinforcing the only 
tentative evidence from the fixed effect specifications in section 4.2.1 that the more capital at 
 
 
19 
risk, the stronger are shareholders’ incentives to monitor management and assure that the 
bank operates efficiently. The rest of the bank specific control variables are statistically 
insignificant in the dynamic panel data framework. When it comes to the country level 
macroeconomic variables the level of the economic development (lnGDPcap) has a positive 
and statistically significant in all the models in Table 11 (at the 5% level in the first six 
models and at the 1% level in the seventh model when we control for the overall economic 
freedom index (ALL-FR). The positive and significant coefficient on the proxy for the 
general level of economic development (lnGDPcap) could  indicate the higher operating and 
financial costs for supplying a given level of services (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000).  
Additionally, the lagged inefficiency is positive and significant at the 1%  level and its high 
magnitude implies the suitability of the of the dynamic panel data estimation. 
An important result is in model 7 of Table 11 that finds the regressor of the overall economic 
freedom index to be negative and statistically significant at the 5% suggesting decreased bank 
inefficiency in countries with more liberal economic systems. Additionally, in model 5 of 
Table 11 the overall regulation variable (REG-FR) is statistically significant at the 5% and 
has a negative impact on inefficiency. This result remains robust, albeit at the lower 
significant level of 10%,  in model 6 when we control for the rest of the major components of 
index of economic freedom. Moreover, the access to sound money variable (MON-FR) is 
found to exert a negative impact on inefficiency (see model 3 of Table 11) although this 
finding does not remain robust in model 6 that included the rest of the major economic 
freedom components. It is important to note that the static fixed effect analysis in the 
previous section (4.2) failed to identify a statistically significant relationship between bank 
inefficiency and the overall index of economic freedom (ALL-FR) and in particular with the 
composite index of regulation (REG-FR). Such results imply that the most important channel 
through which economic freedom affects bank performance is through regulation in credit, 
labour and business. Furthermore the dynamic analysis does not confirm the static fixed 
effects results in relation to the positive impact of the legal rights protection variable (LEG-
FR) on inefficiency as in model 2 of Table 11 this variable is negatively related to 
inefficiency but not statistically significant. 
3.3.2 Credit (CR-REG), Labour (LR-REG) and Business Regulation (BR-REG): Dynamic 
Estimation 
 In order to further examine the impact of regulation on bank inefficiency we decompose as 
in section 4.2.2 the composite regulation (REG-FR) to its major subcomponents: credit 
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regulation (CR-FR), labour regulation (LR-FR) and business regulation (BR-FR). The results 
are available in Table 12. 
(Insert Table 12 about here) 
The results confirm the findings of the static fixed effects specification analysed in section 
3.2.2. In particular the only type of regulation that has a statistically significant impact on 
inefficiency is the labour regulation (LR-FR) variable (see model 2 in table 12). In the 
dynamic panel data analysis though the effect of labour regulation (LR-FR) on inefficiency 
has increased statistical significance at the 1% level as opposed to the 5% level in the static 
fixed effects specifications. Another channel through which liberalisation of the labour 
markets can affect positively firm performance is by increased innovation (Koeniger,2005; 
Barbosa and Faria, 2011) especially in primary innovation with high expected returns such as 
the introduction of new products (Saint Paul, 2002) 
Furthermore, the credit regulation (CR-REG) and the business regulation variables (BR-
REG), as in the static analysis, have not been found to have a significant impact on 
inefficiency. These results remain robust in the fourth specification of Table 12 when all the 
regulatory variables are included in the model.  
3.3.3  Decomposing Credit Regulations: Dynamic Estimation 
In Table 13 we decompose the composite credit regulation (CR-REG) index into its own 
subcomponents and estimate their specific effects on bank inefficiency. 
(Insert Table 13 about here) 
The negative association of the ownership structure (CR-OWN) with bank inefficiency found 
in the static fixed effects analysis is further confirmed in the dynamic panel analysis but this 
time the CR-OWN variable is statistically significant at the 1% level (see model 1 in Table 
13).  This results implies that private ownership of banks increases performance through 
better allocation of credit in the economy because of less political influences in such 
decisions (Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005) and more adherence to market discipline 
because of absence of any explicit or implicit support from the government (Mian, 2003). 
The competition from foreign banks (CR-COMP) is also statistically significant at the 1% 
and with a negative coefficient confirming the static results (see model 2 in Table 13). 
Overall the results of the  dynamic analysis provide evidence that increased privatisation of 
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the banking system and decreased protection from foreign bank presence and competition are 
associated with decreased bank inefficiency. On the other hand the dynamic panel analysis 
does not confirm the evidence that limited crowding  out of private sector borrowing because 
of government borrowing (CR-PRS) is a positive and statistically significant determinant of 
bank inefficiency. Finally, as in static analysis, the interest rate control variable (CR-NIR) 
does not have any statistically significant impact on inefficiency. 
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis – Panel Vector Autoregressive (VAR) estimation 
 
As part of sensitivity analysis we opt for the flexible framework of a  panel-VAR analysis6. 
Essentially all variables in the panel-VAR are entering as endogenous so as to able to resolve 
the causality among them. Also, another advantage of the panel-VAR is that examines the 
underlying dynamic relationships compared with the static functional form of a standard 
fixed effects model. 
For the estimation of each panel VAR we follow the same procedure. As a first step the 
optimal lag order j is assumed for the right-hand variables in the system of equations 
(Lutkepohl, 2006). The Arellano-Bond GMM estimator is used for the lags of j=1,2 and 3.7 
Optimal lag order of one is based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), confirmed by 
Arellano-Bond AR tests. To test for autocorrelation, more lags are added. The Sargan tests 
show that for lag ordered one, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and thus the VAR model 
is of order one. The lag order of one preserves the degrees of freedom and information, given 
the low time frequency of the data.  
Table 9 
3.4.1 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and Variance Decompositions (VDCs) for foreign 
bank competition (CR-COMP), private ownership of banks (CR-OWN), bank size (lnTA) and 
inefficiency (INEF) 
 
The panel-VAR framework allows the examination of the impact of the components of credit 
regulation on cost efficiency in more detail and are included here as a sensitivity analysis. 
Credit regulation is decomposed into four components: ownership (CR-Own), competition 
(CR-Comp), private sector credit (CR-PrS) and restrictions on interest rates (CR-NiR).  As 
above, the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator for the lag of j=1 is used. 
                                                                                                                6  For a formal exposition of the panel VAR methodology see Appendix. 
7 Results are available upon request. 
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The impulse response functions (IRF) derived from the unrestricted panel-VAR in the case of 
bank cost inefficiency (INEF), bank size (lnTA) and the  private ownership of banks (CR-
OWN) and foreign bank competition (CR-COMP) variables are presented in Figure 1 The 
plots show the response of each variable in the panel-VAR (INEF, lnTA, CR-OWN and CR-
COMP) to its own innovation and to the innovations of the other variables.  The first row 
shows the response of INEF on a one standard deviation shock in the lnTA, CR-OWN and 
CR-Comp variables. 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
It becomes apparent that that the effect of CR-OWN and CR-COMP on cost inefficiency is 
negative over the whole period. The peak response of efficiency to both CR-OWN and CR-
COMP is after the second period years, and converge towards equilibrium thereafter. In the 
case of CR-Own and CR-Comp the panel VAR analysis appear to confirm the  previous 
dynamic panel results. Foreign banks, as in Fries and Taci (2005), Bonin et al. (2005), Asaftei 
and Kumbhakar (2005) and Havrylchyk,( 2006) and Pruteanu-Podpiera (2008) through the 
improvement of competition conditions and technological innovations that they bring into the 
domestic markets enhance the performance of all banks, including domestic banks. Along 
these lines the ownership structure, CR-OWN is positively associated with cost inefficiency. 
Furthermore, the response of inefficiency to a shock in bank size (lnTA) is positive in the 
period under study. This result lends some support to the ‘quite life’ hypothesis, which posits 
that banks enjoy the advantages of market power in terms of foregone revenues or cost 
savings although large banks in the new EU-member states have benefited more, in terms of 
average cost reduction, from technological progress (Kasman & Saadet-Kasman, 2006). An 
additional explanation for the negative impact of total assets (lnTA) on cost efficiency could 
be attributed to the remaining large state owned banks that are highly inefficient. 
 
(Insert Table 14 about here) 
Table 14 presents further evidence of the importance of credit specific regulation for bank 
efficiency as reported by the variance decompositions (VDC) estimations for its components. 
These results are consistent with the IRF, and provide further evidence of the importance of 
regulation with respect to privately owned bank assets ownership  in explaining the variation 
in cost efficiency. Specifically,  around 1% of forecast error variance of cost inefficiency 
after 10 years is explained by CR-COMP regulation disturbances, whilst the corresponding 
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figure for CR-OWN is 0.32%.  Finally, around 0.33% of forecast error variance of cost 
inefficiency after 10 years is explained by shocks in the bank size (lnTA). 
 
3.4.2 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and Variance Decompositions (VDCs)  for private 
sector credit (CR-PRS), interest rate controls (CR-NIR),  bank size (lnTA) and inefficiency 
(INEF)   
The impulse response functions (IRF) derived from the unrestricted panel-VAR in the case of 
bank cost inefficiency and the  variables from of the Starting a Business category are 
presented in Figure 2. The plots show the response of each variable in the panel-VAR; cost 
inefficiency (INEF) , private sector credit (CR-PRS), interest rate controls (CR-NIR) and 
bank size (lnTA). The first row shows the response of INEF on a one standard deviation 
shock in lnTA, CR-PRS, CR-NIR. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
The effect of both the credit regulation variables included in the panel VAR, CR-NIR and 
CR-PRS, is negative in the whole period of the study. However, in terms of magnitude, the 
peak response of inefficiency  (INEF) to a shock in the interest rate control index (CR-NIR)  
is -0.0194 while for the private sector credit variable (CR-PRS) stands  at the -0.0096. 
Finally, the response of inefficiency to a shock in bank size (lnTA) is positive in the whole 
period under study  as in section 4.4.1. 
(Insert Table 15 about here) 
 
These results are further confirmed from the variance decomposition (VDC) estimations 
depicted in table 15. In a 10 year time frame around 1.02% of the forecast error variance of 
inefficiency (INEF) can be explained by disturbances in the interest rate control (CR-NIR) 
variable while around 0.08% from disturbances in the private sector credit (CR-PRS) 
variable. This result implies the beneficial for the banking sector allowance of interest rate to 
be determined by market forces rather than government interference. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
This is the first study that tries to assess the interaction between inefficiency and regulation in 
the banking industry of the new EU member states.  These countries are from Central and 
Eastern Europe and have only in the past decade or so had to manage the transition from 
central to a market economy.  Established parametric methods (stochastic frontier analysis) 
are used to construct inefficiency estimation and these scores are used in  both static and 
dynamic panel data models to investigate the impact of credit, labour and business regulation 
of bank inefficiency.   
Using the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom we find that, among the five major components 
(government size, legal structure and property rights protection, access to sound money, trade 
freedom and regulation), the composite regulation index that includes regulation in credit, 
labour and business is the one that has more importance for the banking sector as it exerts a 
negative and statistically significant impact on bank inefficiency.  
Furthermore, by decomposing the regulation index, into its three components (credit, 
business and labour regulation) we find that strict labour regulation is associated with higher 
bank inefficiency lending support to the view that more liberal labour markets are associated 
with increase economic performance. Furthermore, although the aggregate credit regulation 
index, does not exert a statistically significant impact on bank inefficiency, decomposing 
credit regulation further provides a richer set of results. In particular, aspects of foreign 
ownership and competition as well as private ownership are significantly associated with 
decreased bank inefficiency. The dynamic panel-VAR results using impulse response 
functions and variance decomposition support the validity of these results further. 
The paper is timely as several EU member states appear to have fragile financial systems.  
Regulation of the banking sectors in the transition countries is recent and this study shows 
that it enhances bank operating performance.   Overall, credit regulation in the transition 
countries is recent and this study shows it enhances bank operating performance. Labour 
regulation also asserts a negative impact on inefficiency.  These results are valuable for both 
academics and policy makers in their attempts to understand what could drive bank 
efficiency. Clearly, following an ambitious reform agenda, in particular in terms of 
improving competition, are warranted. 
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